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BLD-171        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1418 
___________ 
 
 IN RE:  JASON BROWN, 
                        Petitioner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2-16-cv-04528) 
           _____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
March 23, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 15, 2017) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se petitioner, Jason Brown, seeks a writ of mandamus directing the City of 
Philadelphia (hereafter “City”) and Community Behavioral Health of Philadelphia 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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(hereafter “CBH”) to pay him $900.000.  We will dismiss the petition. 
 Brown’s mandamus petition is anything but a model of clarity.  As best we can 
decipher, it appears that Brown takes issue with some policies put forth by the City and 
CBH.  Brown asserts that these policies violate certain of his civil rights and, in fact, he 
filed a civil action against the City and CBH in August 2016.  See Brown v. City of 
Phila., et al., E.D. Civ. No. 16-cv-04528.  Brown sought leave to proceed with the 
complaint in forma pauperis.  However, because the affidavit of poverty provided by 
Brown contained no financial information, the District Court concluded that it was 
“insufficient” for purposes of determining Brown’s ability to pay the associated filing 
fees.  An order was thus entered denying the motion without prejudice.  We dismissed 
Brown’s appeal from that order for lack of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
See C.A. No. 16-3508.  Brown has since submitted an amended affidavit supporting his 
in forma pauperis motion, which remains pending before the District Court. 
 Our mandamus jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the 
power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [our] . . . jurisdiction[] and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  A writ of mandamus is an extreme 
remedy that is invoked only in extraordinary situations.  See Kerr v. United States Dist. 
Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  Traditionally, it may be used “only ‘to confine an 
inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise 
its authority when it is its duty to do so.’”  Id. (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 
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95 (1967)). 
Brown does not allege an action or omission by a United States District Court 
within this circuit over which we might exercise our mandamus authority. Cf. United 
States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir. 1981) (focal question for federal appellate 
court is whether action of District Court impedes appellate jurisdiction granted in some 
other provision of law).  Even if we broadly construed his petition as directed at the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, we would deny mandamus relief.  
While Brown’s in forma pauperis motion has been pending in the District Court for 
several months, we note that the pendency of his appeal from the original dismissal 
accounted for some of that time.  We are confident that the District Court will consider 
Brown’s motion without undue delay.  Brown is free to file a mandamus petition seeking 
to compel the District Court to rule on his pending in forma pauperis motion if an order is 
not forthcoming in the near future. 
Of course, if Brown is found eligible for pauper status, the District Court will then 
screen his complaint pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).  Brown’s 
recourse for any dissatisfaction with the District Court’s disposition of the claims in his 
complaint must then be had through the appellate process after the court’s entry of a final 
order.  See In re: Chambers Dev. Co., Inc., 148 F. 3d 214, 226 (3d Cir. 1998) (mandamus 
relief is not available as a substitute for an appeal). 
Moreover, Brown does not allege an action or omission by a federal officer, 
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employee, or agency over which a United States District Court would have mandamus 
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United 
States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”).  Brown asks only 
that we issue a writ of mandamus compelling “action” by city officials.  Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1651 and Kerr, we lack mandamus authority to compel the respondents to perform their 
duties, or, as Brown would have it, to pay him damages as a sanction for failing to 
perform those duties in accordance with his wishes.  See, e.g., In re Wolenski, 324 F.2d 
309, 309 (3d Cir. 1963) (per curiam) (explaining that District Court “had no jurisdiction” 
to “issue a writ of mandamus compelling action by a state official”); see also White v. 
Ward, 145 F.3d 1139, 1140 (10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (explaining that federal courts 
“lack[ ] jurisdiction to direct a state court to perform its duty”); Demos v. United States 
Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Wash., 925 F.2d 1160, 1161 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]his court 
lacks jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to a state court.”).  That argument is one 
for the District Court to consider in evaluating the merits of Brown’s civil complaint. 
Accordingly, as we lack jurisdiction to grant the request for mandamus relief, we 
will dismiss the petition. 
